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Introduction
Slow progress within the EU Eastern Partnership (EaP) program
and disappointment of all affected partners can be explained by both
problems arising on the EU and the Eastern Partners’ side. Besides
recent economic difficulties, diverging member state interests and
approaches including the ‘South versus East’ problem2, shared com-
petencies between EU institutions, uncertainties of conditionality3,
1 The study is based on the research supported by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund
(OTKA) Project No. K105914. An earlier version was published by the Istituto Affari Interna-
zionali, in Documenti IAI 13, 2013 
2 Visegrad countries and Sweden for instance are among major supporters of the Eastern Part-
ners, while France and other member states from the Southern part of the EU are more inter-
ested in the other direction of the ENP, that is in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Ger-
many’s positions are of key importance. 
3 Belarus is a good example where the EU has been hesitating or has had problems when
trying to establish conditionality for the past few years. Here on the one hand the EU would
like to send clear and definite messages to the recent authoritarian Belarusian leadership, on
the other it does not wish to put punishment on the population. A second problematic country
is Ukraine, where conditionality got impetus due to the negative turn in domestic political de-
velopments, but where even most recent ‘conditions’ of the EU are not clear. (According to
the Council conclusions on Ukraine, of 10 December 2012, the  EU is ready to  sign the
already initialled Association Agreement in case  Ukrainian authorities “address the cases of po-
litically motivated convictions...”, but the document does not mention the Julia Timoshenko
case as a concrete condition.) Relations with Azerbaijan also raise the problem of conditionality:
the EU has been often blamed of being too tolerant with the country possessing huge energy
sources in which the EU is interested.
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problems on EU side include some major deficiencies like the lack
of incentive of EU membership or the slow progress in the visa-free
movement of people, the a second major issue for most EaPs. All in
all the ‘carrot’ offered by the EU is a small one compared to the ap-
petite of the targeted countries. At the same time Eastern Partners
can also be blamed since most of them delay in ‘doing their home-
work’ to transform their political, juridical or economic systems.
The paper argues that in some cases this ‘delay’ that is the lack of
real commitment to doing the homework is greatly influenced by a
third factor, namely the forced choice on foreign policy orientation
for which Eastern Partners seem to be either not ready or not ded-
icated enough. The next EU-EaP summit to be held in Vilnius in
the Autumn, 2013 might become a milestone in this respect. The
core of the problem roots in the EU ‘offer’ of deep and compre-
hensive free trade agreements (DCFTAs) that institutionally exclude
the possibility of the Eastern Partner’s parallel economic integration
towards East. The first-ever EU EaP Association Agreement includ-
ing a DCFTA is expected to be signed in this summit with Ukraine.
Eastern Partners can be divided into two groups. The first includes
those partners that declared their willingness to become members of
the European Union: Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. These states
have been expecting clear signs, reflecting worthy of their European
choice from the EU. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),
and particularly the EaP, as the answer to these expectations on part
of the EU is not convincing enough for them. Meanwhile, their do-
mestic political landscapes have been changing as well. For instance,
Ukraine has become a more reluctant or at least hesitating partner,
while due to most recent domestic political events Moldovan com-
mitment might become also uncertain in the future. Shifts in these
two countries are important, since after the initial period when
Ukraine was the pioneer country in the Eastern dimension of the
ENP, for the past few years Moldova has been seen as the ‘best pupil
in the class’ that is the most advanced in rapprochement to the EU.
Definitely, now, Georgia remains the most determined Eastern Part-
ner. Although members of the second group, Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Belarus, have less definite goals and they intend to establish close
ties without any real commitment to the EU, the forced choice
might be relevant even for some of them in the future. 
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Eastern Partners between 
the European Union and Russia
After a short period of cooperative approach at the beginning of
the 2000’s4, the EU and Russia evidently got involved into a com-
petition or even rivalry over their common post-Soviet neighbours
with a most obvious struggle for Ukraine evolving for the past few
years. In 2003 the EU launched the European Neighbourhood
Policy followed by a more targeted program within the Eastern
Partnership initiative in 2009. EaP offers ‘deep and comprehensive
free trade agreements’ (DCFTAs) as a core economic element of
the planned Association Agreements.5 On its side, Russia also ini-
tiated an ambitious integration project in the post-Soviet space,
namely the Customs Union (CU) within the Eurasian Economic
Community in 2010 now called as ‘Single Economic Space’ (SES),
and with the final goal of creating an Eurasian Economic Union.  
Both ‘offers’ have their severe economic consequences making
the choice for the EaPs hard. The necessity of the choice is due to
the fact that the Russia-led CU/SES goes beyond the level of a
free trade regime which makes the two parallel rapprochements
impossible for institutional reasons. However, while economic
benefits of the DCFTAs with the EU might be expected mainly
in the long run (like the positive changes of the economic struc-
ture, more keen market competition leading to increased compet-
itiveness, economic growth and increased welfare etc.)6, the eco-
nomic disadvantages of rejecting the Russian offer will arise
immediately. 
4 In 2002 the EU and Russia jointly worked out a ‘White Book’ on their economic co-opera-
tion with a possible extension of the results of bilateral co-operation such as the planned Com-
mon Economic Space to other post-Soviet states. (Belaja Knyiga, 2002) 
5 In fact, it is not possible to conclude the Association Agreement (AA) on political co-opera-
tion without signing the DCFTA and DCFTA cannot be applied without a signed AA, which
is a major hampering factor in the whole process in both cases: either in a case when a country
is politically determined (Georgia) or when it is ready for deeper economic co-operation but
political conditions are still not satisfactory (the case of the finalised DCFTA of Ukraine).
6 Long-term economic benefits have been predicted in several impact assessments studies made
by up till now either for Ukraine or Georgia. See for example CEPS, IFW and ICPS (2006)
for Ukraine; Kakulia (2013) for Georgia. However, interestingly there are Ukrainian estimati-
ons, according to which Ukraine will not benefit from the DCFTA at all. One of them was
made by the Institute for Economics and Forecasting of the Ukrainian National Academy of
Sciences. Sidenko (2013) and Shynkaruk (2013)
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The European Union is not ready to offer the membership per-
spective to the Eastern Partners in the foreseeable future and seems
to be rather reluctant in providing visa free regime for them as
well. Visa free movement has been linked to very strict, mainly
technical conditions.7 Reluctance on the EU part concerning the
free movement of citizens of EaPs might turn to be a bad policy
in this competition as well. Despite the strong pressure from some
EaPs for visa-free movement of their citizens to the EU, visa free
regimes can be expected only in the long term.8 At the same time
citizens of most post-Soviet countries can enter Russia without
visa, with Georgia being the only EaP for which visa is needed.
Georgia is not only the most distant post-Soviet partner regarding
new post-Soviet integration projects but belongs to the small
group of two post-Soviet countries outside the CIS as well.9 The
visa regime introduced by Russia towards Georgia well illustrates
its differentiated and presumably differentiating policy approach
towards certain post-Soviet countries in the future.
Eastern Partners face a challenging integration/orientation
dilemma. Most of them still have very close ties to other post-So-
viet economies, mostly to Russia, in several cases and sectors even
with strong dependencies, while they are in the process of devel-
oping privileged economic links with the EU as well. Now, they
are or in the future they will be forced to choose between integra-
tion course to the West or East, between Russia or the EU, since
in the EU approach integration to the EU Single Market excludes
economic integration into other integration groups at the same
time for institutional reasons.10While this choice, often considered
to be a political one, does not seem to be a problem for some EaPs
(like Georgia), it creates difficulties for others (at the time being
the hottest for Ukraine) with serious short, medium or long term
economic consequences. 
7 EU membership is a no. 1. priority for three countries (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia),
while visa free movement of citizens is key issue for all the six countries. 
8 EaPs argue that the state of their technical preparedness and the general level of migration
‘threat’ they represent  is not really worse than it was in some Western Balkan countries that
were exempted from EU visa regime during the past few years, pointing to the political cha-
racter of the decision instead of the technical one emphasized by the EU.
9 Turkmenistan is the other one.
10 A major problem originates from the lack of WTO-membership of Belarus and Kazakhstan.
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The EU is a key economic partner for the European post-Soviet
countries. The economic interests of the EU are most manifest re-
garding the energy sources of the post-Soviet region, although de-
veloping trade and investment opportunities are also on the agen-
da. The European Union is already a major trade partner for four
of the European post-Soviet economies, except for Ukraine and
Belarus (based on figures for 2010 and 2011). Here, Ukraine rep-
resents a major issue with its so-called ‘double ties’ manifested also
in foreign economic relations, a challenge which the country seem-
ingly has not been able to address so far. Although the European
Union is not ready to offer membership perspective to these af-
fected countries, it intends to get these economies involved into
its Single Market through its DCFTA idea. The idea is open to all
EaP countries that are members of the WTO, that is Azerbaijan
and Belarus, possessing only observer status in the organization,
are at the moment out of the scope of the initiative.
Russia still constitutes the economic centre of the post-Soviet
space. On the one hand, it is the major partner or can be found
among most important economic partners for most post-Soviet
economies. Russia constitutes a major trade partner, an important
investor and an attractive centre for labor migration in almost all
cases. Besides, the ‘Russia issue’ cannot be neglected in the sphere
of energy, neither in the case of energy exporters nor for energy
importers of the region. Transit aspects also largely matter. On the
other hand, it has the ambition to be the centre for them evi-
denced by its integration plans and ideas, already in the process.
However, Russian ambitions and plans for integrating the analyzed
countries face competition on part of other regional powers, like
the EU (or Turkey). Even so, Russian intentions to achieve eco-
nomic integration with other countries of the post-Soviet space by
creating an independent power centre have rarely been taken seri-
ously by the West so far. The argumentation behind this neglect-
ing approach has been basically linked to the failures of different
post-Soviet or Russian-led integration initiatives, the phenomenon
of ‘institutions on paper’, treaties with thousands of exceptions,
up until now. We argue that these new Russian projects, namely
the Single Economic Space (SES) based on the Customs Union
of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and the dreamed Eurasian Eco-
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nomic Union the core of which is the Eurasian Economic Com-
munity (EurAsEC) including Kirgizstan and Tajikistan beside the
three above mentioned states, deserve a deeper attention, as they
have taken concrete forms and constitute one of the main focuses
of Russia’s current foreign policy. Economic factors and economic
methods are getting to constitute a more and more important di-
mension of competition between countries and regional powers.
Russia intends to build up or rebuild a Russia-led economic power
centre in the Eurasian continent, particularly in the post-Soviet
space, which is naturally a ‘political plan’ at the same time. This
ambition has become manifest during the last decade when Russia
experienced considerable economic growth (especially in the years
2000-2008) and political stability, which allowed it to focus on
projecting its power in the “near abroad”. Russia has both at-
tempted to develop close and strong political relations with the
countries in the region, and formulated a concrete economic in-
tegration plan in its neighbourhood. 
A basic question is whether Russia will able to be a real and at-
tractive gravity centre in her near area, abroad or not. Naturally
the answer will be partly ‘yes’ and partly ‘no’. Some post-Soviet
countries (some EaPs) are likely to join or have already joined the
Russian-led integration grouping, while others want to and may
vote against this option. 
The common post-Soviet European neighbourhood is evidently
a most important issue in recent EU-Russian dialogue. It is even
more: one of the main hampering factors in EU-Russian rap-
prochement. No significant development in EU-Russia relations
can be achieved without arriving at a compromise on this issue.
Although the EU has been emphasizing that the EaP is not an an-
ti-Russian project, the EaP created deep tensions between the two
partners. It received a rather chilly welcome from Russia who con-
sidered it as an initiative in conflict with its own ideas. Beyond the
general political motivations for being a gravity centre for the re-
gion, energy and trade issues constitute the most evident fields of
clashing interests between Russia and the EU.11
11 European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2012.
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The forced choice 
Tensions between Russia and the EU over Ukraine became public
during 2011, although they existed well before this year.12  Ukraine
followed its well-known multivectoral policy during the nineties,
and tried to keep it even after its euro-integration priority had al-
ready been declared. ENP evidently targeted Ukraine as a no. 1.
country in 2003-2004 (in 2003 within the Wider Europe concept)
but as a slight shift from a balanced multivectorism Ukraine joined
the Russian initiated Common Economic Space involving Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan also in 2003 but leaving it soon
after the orange revolution. Since these times, Ukraine has been
balancing between East and West, Russia and the EU, trying to
collect benefits from both sides, but at moment the country is un-
der high pressure to make a choice.
The EU’s DCFTA plan has been most deeply elaborated in re-
lation with Ukraine. The DCFTA is part of the EU-Ukrainian As-
sociation Agreement and is based on Ukrainian WTO membership
and the declared Ukrainian commitment to the EU integration
course. Although recent Ukrainian political leadership has been
critical of the content of the DCFTA agreement basically negoti-
ated under the previous Ukrainian government, negotiations were
finalized at the end of 2011. The first ever EU DCFTA was ini-
tialled in spring 2012, but its signing and ratification has been held
up by domestic Ukrainian events, among others the imprisonment
of the ex-prime minister, Yulia Timoshenko and the prosecution
of other representatives of the opposition evidently on political
ground. Although several conditions of the EU have already been
met by Ukraine, the Timoshenko-case seems to be a crucial point
in the future of the Association Agreement. 
Meanwhile, Russian ideas on post-Soviet reintegration have been
also developing and getting concrete forms. Three economies es-
tablished the Customs Union, a formula very similar to the Com-
mon Economic Space (CES) initiative launched in 2003.
Ukraine’s absence from the new organisation constitutes the dif-
12 See for example Ludvig (2007).
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ference between the two country groupings.13 However, beside
the importance of bilateral Ukrainian-Russian economic ties on
the micro level, any post-Soviet integration grouping would need
Ukraine, the second biggest and most advanced post-Soviet econ-
omy. Ukrainian participation is evidently necessary to achieve the
dream of a post-Soviet economic centre as an important pillar of
the multipolar world. Moreover, the decisions of Ukraine, the
largest and most influential country within the EaP, may have an
impact on the course of other EaPs as well.14 This is why for the
past few years Russia has been making pressure on Ukraine to join
the CU. 
The EU argues that a potential Ukrainian membership in the
Russian-Belarus-Kazakh Customs Union would not match with
the planned EU-Ukrainian DCFTA and is definitely against
Ukrainian WTO commitments. But Russia made it clear that with-
out joining the Customs Union Ukrainian intentions to renegoti-
ate principles of gas pricing, agreed under the Timoshenko-gov-
ernment, are only illusions. In exchange for the Ukrainian
participation Russia not only offers cheap gas but the elimination
of export duties concerning its oil and oil products, providing
compensation for potential Ukrainian payments due to WTO
members’ claims and the elimination of safeguard measures intro-
duced against several Ukrainian producers. Altogether according
to Russian calculations the Russian offer totals to about 6.5-9 bil-
lion dollar a year.15 Furthermore, keeping distance from the CU
threatens Ukraine with facing new product wars, a widely used
tool for the past years by Russia, and as a counter measure by
Ukraine, as well. This is how Ukraine became the object of a dou-
ble mill game.16 At the moment, Ukraine is in an “either or” sit-
13 Ukraine participated in the CES at its starting phase, signed the basic agreement, but after
the orange revolution the new Ukrainian leadership decided to leave the project, stating that
Ukraine is interested only in a FTA level of the Russia-led integration. Both CES aimed and
recent CU aims at a higher than FT stage of integration among members.
14 Shumylo –Tapiola (2012) p. 20.
15 Shumylo –Tapiola  (2012) p. 21.
16 On the significance of the CU head of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Leonid
Kozhara stated the following in Washington , 9th May 2013: „...no country can change its ge-
ographical position. This means that Ukraine has no other option but to strive to maintain
good neighbourly and partnership relations with Russia…Thus, Ukraine will seek the modalities
of its cooperation with the Customs Union.” 
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uation since none of its two major partners seem to seek compro-
mise. Ukraine suggested having observer status in the CU, but it
is not in Russian interests and plans to not have Ukraine fully. Al-
though, according to the basic document of the CU, in the long
term Russia is thinking of a large Eurasian Economic Union link-
ing the SES/CU to other states of the Eurasian continent in the
longer run perhaps even with the EU17, in the short run the com-
petitive element of the Russian approach seems to be stronger than
the cooperative one. At least, the officially stated Russian vision
on a future Pan-European common economic area is not in accord
with its strongly negative reactions to the EU DCFTA plans.18
Moldova and Armenia might also create tensions. Although,
Moldovan economy with its small size and insignificance is not re-
ally crucial for any Russian plan, a definite Moldovan choice for
the EU may lead to serious economic consequences in the coun-
try. Russia would not welcome such a decision for political
reasons.19 Though Armenia at the moment is further from achiev-
ing a DCFTA with the EU than Ukraine or Moldova are now, a
potential Armenian-EU DCFTA would also be painful for Russia
and could lead to difficulties in both EU-Russian bilateral relations
and Armenian-Russian relationship. Furthermore, although the
country is not a formal member of the EurAsEC, neither of the
Customs Union, it takes part in the Collective Security Treaty Or-
ganization (CSTO) and in some EurAsEC-operated entities as
well, like the Anti-Crisis Fund and Innovation Fund which indicate
its interests in post-Soviet initiatives aimed at (partial) re-integra-
tion of post-Soviet economies.20 
17 The final aim of the Russian projects is to “proceed towards creating the Eurasian Economic
Union with other countries, international economic blocs, and the European Union, with the
attainment of common economic space”, that is Russian initiatives would make part of a broader
integration process on the whole Euarasian space. Sidenko (2011)
18 Though not so evidently, Russia launched a similar competition in another ‘common ne-
ighborhood’, in the West-Balkans in 2011 when inviting Serbia and Montenegro, now both
being EU candidates, to the Russia-led CU.
19 Although according to Moldovan expert calculations the potential balance of benefits and
costs of an eventual membership in the CU/SES would be negative mostly due to the high
Russian/CU import tariff rates leading to price increase in the country (Lupusor, 2013), in a
situation of a concrete Russian offer Moldova could easily face similar to thecurrent Ukrainian
pressure.   But evidently Transnistria constiutes the most sensitive issue.
20 Sidenko (2011)
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For three countries the orientation dilemma does not exist, at
least not in the foreseeable future. Georgia surely has not been a
target country for new Russian post-Soviet (re)integration inten-
tions due to the political tensions between the two countries. On
its side recently Georgia follows, probably, the most definite Eu-
ropean course from among EaPs with full readiness to meet Eu-
ropean expectations. Contrary to Georgia, Belarus’s path is just
the opposite not only because without WTO-membership EU
DCFTA offer is out of question, but for political reasons as well.21
From among EaPs Belarus is represented in all Russia-initiated
post-Soviet integration groupings. 
The third country, Azerbaijan is in a favourable situation not be-
ing dependent neither on Russia, nor on the EU due to its en-
dowment in natural resources, the EU and Russia are both inter-
ested in. Azerbaijan is most likely to follow its multipolar foreign
(and foreign economic) policy in the foreseeable future.22
Table 1. 
Relevance of the ‘Forced Choice’ Dilemma for the Eastern Partners 
21 However, a radical domestic political turn, not being likely right now, but cannot be excluded
in the long run, would put the orientation dilemma on the agenda immediately. 
22 Mazziotti, M. – Sauerborn, D – Scianna, B. M. (2013)
EU membership wanted, declared
No EU membership but different
benefits from the EU wanted
the existence of
integration
dilemma (+ or -)
the existence of
integration
dilemma (+ or -)
Ukraine + Armenia
- , but may 
turn to: +
Moldova
- ,
but may turn: +
Azerbaijan -
Georgia - Belarus -
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Foreign economic relations (trade, FDI,
labour migration) in the mirror of 
statistics – EU versus Russia and the
Customs Union
When analysing the ‘in-between’ situation of the Eastern Partners
and the attractiveness of the two gravity centres, concrete strength
of foreign economic relations between the EU and EaPs on the
one hand, and Russia and EaPs on the other should be taken into
consideration as well. Trade, FDI and migration flows and ten-
dencies are subjects to analysis in this chapter in order to evaluate
the prospects and relevancies of economic integration initiatives
with this or that partner. 
From among EaP economies, Ukraine is the most interesting
one since the EU and Russia are almost equally important eco-
nomic partners of the country. Trade figures for the past few years
have been very close to each other. Regarding FDI, both actors
have considerable influence on the economy, while Ukrainian la-
bor migration also intensively targets the EU, Russia (and Turkey!)
as well. For Belarus, the EU and Russia are major economic part-
ners at the moment, but taking into consideration all kinds of eco-
nomic links and dependencies, Russia is the dominant one. Be-
larusian economy is evidently dependent on Russia in several
aspects. For Moldova and Armenia the EU is by far the most im-
portant economic gravity centre; however, these countries also
have strong links to the Russian economy in some sectors even
with deep dependency on it. Georgia and Azerbaijan represent the
two special cases. Economic relations between Georgia and Russia
were almost entirely cut due to the political tensions that led to
the 2008 August war, but this cut caused serious harms to the
economy. Furthermore, Russian capital is still present in key com-
panies and Georgian sectors. The Azerbaijani economy is the only
one being not dependent on Russia. The country enjoys economic
benefits of being important partner both for Russia and the EU.
However, in the post-crisis period a new tendency has appeared
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with the rise of influence and significance of third countries like
China or Turkey. On their side, post-Soviet countries under the
pressure of the forced choice make also efforts to develop or
strengthen third pillars of their set of economic links. Next sub-
chapters provide more detailed information on recent state and
trends in the development of these economic ties based on statistics.
2010 2011
Moldova
EXPORTS
1. EU
(47.5)
2. Russia
(26.2)
1. EU
(51.6)
2. Russia
20.8)
IMPORTS
1. EU
(44.4)
2. Russia
(15.3)
1.EU
(55.6)
3. Russia
(8.8)
Ukraine
EXPORTS
Russia
(26.2)
2. EU
(25.5)
1. Russia
(28.9)
2. EU
(26.5)
IMPORTS
1. Russia
(36.2)
2. EU
(31.3)
1. Russia
(35.4)
2. EU
(31.2)
Belarus
EXPORTS*
EU
(43.8)
2. Russia
(31.5)
1.EU
(37.9)
2. Russia
(35.1)
IMPORTS*
Russia
(58.5)
2. EU
(23.0)
1. Russia
(54.7)
2. EU
(19.0)
Armenia
EXPORTS
1. EU
(48.1)
2. Russia
(15.4)
1. EU
(45.5)
2. Russia
(16.7)
IMPORTS
1.EU
(27.5)
2.Russia
(22.3)
1. EU
(28.3)
2. Russia
(21.5)
Azerbaijan
EXPORTS
1. EU
(47.9)
7. Russia
(3.7)
1. EU
(59.4)
3. Russia
(4.5)
IMPORTS
1. EU
(25.4)
2. Russia
(17.4)
1. EU
(32.4)
2. Russia
(16.8)
Georgia
EXPORTS
1.EU
(18.3)
9. Russia
(2.2)
1. EU
(19.5)
18. Russia
(0.5)
IMPORTS
1.EU
(28.4)
6.Russia
(5.6)
1. EU
(29.1)
36. Russia
(0.1)
* Data for Belarus are for 2009 instead of 2010.
Source: Eurostat
Table 2.
Ranking and Share (%) of EU and Russia in EaPs Exports and Imports,
in 2010-2011
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Trade 
International trade was hit strongly by the world economic crisis
bottoming in 2009. 2010 and 2011 already showed growing ten-
dency worldwide and across Europe as well. In these two years the
EU was a major partner for Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia both in export and import side, while ranking first in Be-
larus exports also both in 2010 and 2011. Russia was the biggest
export and import partner for Ukraine and ranked first in Belaru-
sian imports during 2010-2011 with a share above 50 per cent (see
table 2).
To conclude, the EU is by far the most important trading part-
ner of the Eastern Partners, with a slightly growing significance
for the region as a whole. However, in Ukraine, the key country
within the EaP framework Russia is the number 1. trade partner,
while Russia ranks first in the second biggest economy, in Belarus
as well.23 As a new element Eastern Partners have started to devel-
op trade relations with third countries heavily and this has been
leading to strengthening positions on part of China and Turkey
in the first line, but others as well.  These new tendencies can be
linked both to intentions to reduce dependency on Russia and to
EU internal economic problems. However, economic links with
other than Russian post-Soviet economies are also strong and on
rise among EaPs and with others like Kazakhstan, providing argu-
mentation for thinking over joining new post-Soviet integrations.24
It is worth having a closer look at Ukrainian figures of the past
years in order to have a deep insight into the Ukrainian orientation
dilemma. Since 2007, exports to the three countries of the CU
have been exceeding exports to the EU27, while Russian shares
alone have been higher than EU ones since 2010. On the import
side 2009 was the turning point for the CU and 2010 for Russia
to have higher shares as compared to the EU ones. 
23 In 2011 Turkey represented the 3. most important export destination for Moldova and Uk-
raine, while it was 3. in Armenian imports. China ranked 3. in Moldovan, Ukrainian, Belarusian
and Georgian imports. Iran was the 3. export partner for Armenia according to Eurostat data base.
24 Ukraine was the 2. import partner for Moldova and the 3. for Belarus, while the latter ranked
2. in Georgian import list in 2011. Exports from Georgia to Kazakhstan, the 2. top export
partner totalled to almost 20 per cent in 2011. 
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Figure 1.
Ukrainian Exports to the EU, the CU and Russia, 2005-2012 (billion USD)
Source: State Statistic Service of Ukraine 
Figure 2.
Ukrainian Imports from the EU, the CU and Russia, 
2005-2012 (billion USD)
Source: State Statistic Service of Ukraine 
FDI
Although due to methodological reasons, it is not possible to show
the exact EU and Russian shares in total FDI stock of individual
EaPs, some major outlines can be formulated. EU companies have
invested much more capital into these economies than Russia for
the past one-two decades but the significance of the latter is also
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to be emphasized. According to official Russian statistics, Belarus
with 35.5 % share in total Russian OFDI stock in CIS, Ukraine
(27%), Kazakhstan (12.7%) and Armenia (10.9%) are major recip-
ient countries of Russian FDI, while in the statistics that tries to
exclude the misleading phenomenon of ‘round-tripping’ and ‘hid-
den Russian capital’25, the leading position of Ukraine (38 %) is
evident. Under this calculations Ukraine is followed by Kazakhstan
(25.3%), Belarus (15.6%) and Uzbekistan (6.8%).26 Although
based on both statistics the first three countries are the same, the
latter statistics highlight more the importance of Ukraine for the
new post-Soviet, Russia-led integration groupings. Ukrainian-
Russian economic links on company level are extremely strong.
Table 3. 
Russian and EU FDI stock in Ukraine, as of Dec. 31. 2012
Source: State Statistic Service of Ukraine
25 Round-tripping means that a certain part of statistically inward FDI is not of foreign origin
in reality, but domestic capital instead, that left the country for different, mainly tax-avoiding
reasons and comes back as foreign. ’Hidden origin’ in this case refers to capital of Russian origin
coming to Ukraine, also as Cyprian. According to assumptions the Ukrainian part is the domi-
nant one, but Russian share is also not negligible.
26 Trudovaya migraciya v EEP (2012) p. 132. and p. 139. The statistical data base built up and
used by the authors’ is based on company level information instead of macro statistics. 
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Although based on official statistics, the EU is by far the most
important source of FDI in Ukraine, Russia as a country investor
must be among leading ones when excluding the consequences of
the ‘round-tripping’ and ‘hidden origin’ phenomena, with Russian
sum being perhaps close to the figure for Germany, the biggest
EU investor. Although due to lack of exact information on Russian
and Ukrainian shares in FDI coming from Cyprus, one must be
very careful with these calculations it is obvious that real sum for
FDI stock of Russian origin in Ukraine is higher than the official
figure indicates. Recent events in Cyprus might have a major in-
fluence on this picture but these impacts are hard to be evaluated
at the time being. Presumably, Russian investors will chose other
channels for hiding their real identities. This phenomenon affects
other post-Soviet economies as well, but its extent is the biggest
one regarding Ukraine.
Moreover, it is notable that newly launched post-Soviet Customs
Union has already had strong positive impact on capital flows with-
in its frames through the gradual introduction of national treat-
ment. Regulations ease FDI flows from one member state to an-
other even now.27 This trend is due to maintain. As a conclusion one
may state that the balance of FDI is evidently for the EU, but the
influence of Russian capital should not be underestimated, neither.
Labour migration
The largest EU economies like Germany, Italy or Spain are natu-
rally most frequently chosen as target countries by post-Soviet la-
bor migrants. According to a study made for the Federal Office
for Migration and Refugees (Germany) most of post-Soviet mi-
grants lived in Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic and Spain in
2010, with Ukraine, (Russia) and Moldova being the main coun-
tries of origin.28 As for Ukraine, a major source of immigration,
the number of persons with country of birth indicated ‘Ukraine’
27 As a result a massive Russian FDI outflow has been observed for the past 1-2 years from
Russia to Kazakhstan  mainly due to the fact that ‘doing business’ rating of Kazakhstan (and
even of Belarus) is much better than that of Russia. Glinkina (2012)
28 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, Research Report  (2012 )
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totalled to 191.9 thousand in Italy, 155.5 thousand in Poland,
116.4 for the Czech Republic and 84.5 thousand in Spain in 2011,
in all with a growth from 2010 except for the Czech Republic
based on Eurostat data base. Although figures for migration from
post-Soviet countries to the EU are rather high and according to
calculations approximately 1.5 million migrants from the CIS lived
in the EU in 2010, post-Soviet migration29 targeting Russia and
other CIS economies is also considerable, with Russia and Kaza-
khstan being on first places as destination countries. 
Post-Soviet states still constitute the most important and even
dominating sending country group for Russia. Based on figures of
the 2010 census in Russia nearly 86 per cent of all residents with
foreign citizenship were citizens of any other post-Soviet state. Be-
tween 2000 and 2006 the top 10 sources were post-Soviet states
(excluding only Turkmenistan out of the top list). CIS countries
are also estimated to be the main source of irregular migration
with these migrants in most cases belonging to the category of la-
bor migration.  For citizens of Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia or oth-
er countries Russia offers a better living (see table 3). 
Contrary to the tendencies of the 1990’s when massive ethnic
migration could be observed, 2000’s can be characterized by labor
migration. The figures for labor migration have been increasing
since mid 2000’s to the start of the economic crisis. According to
the figures of Russian Federal Service on Migration, the number
of labor migrants decreased from 2.43 million in 2008 to 1.64
million by 2010 from which 1.25 million arrived from the CIS.30
This figure is very close to the figure of 1.5 million migrants from
the CIS registered in the EU. From among EaPs Ukraine and
Moldova belong to the biggest sending post-Soviet states. Remit-
tances from work in Russia greatly contribute to the incomes of
the sending countries and their population.31 Even in Georgia
Russian share is about 65 per cent of all remittances, the latter con-
stituting 6 per cent of the GDP based on figures for 2011. Russian
29 IOM (2008)
30 Trudovaya migraciya v EEP (2012)  p. 11. 
31 The more than 30 per cent share of remittances in Tajikistan and Moldova compared to the
GDP is the highest in the world.
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share is about 80 per cent in Azerbaijan32. One should take into
account that these two countries represent the most independent
economies from the Russia from among EaPs. 
As an impact of the world economic crisis the level of Russian
unemployment grew significantly leading to a new Russian migra-
tion policy aimed at limiting the number of labor migrants. But
Russian migration policy turned not only into tightening but dif-
ferentiation as well. For those post-Soviet countries ready to par-
32 Kiss (2013) p. 57. and p. 63. 
head
share of nationality
in total foreign
immigrants (%)
Azerbaijan 67947 9.9
Armenia 59351 8.6
Belarus 27668 4.0
Ukraine 93390 13.6
Georgia 12077 1.8
Moldova 33884 4.9
EaP together 294317 42.8
post-Soviet together 590748 85.9
Europe together
(without post-Soviet)
16470 2.4
China 28382 4.1
Vietnam 11084 1.6
Turkey 5400 0.8
India 4489 0.7
persons with foreign citi-
zenships all together
686993 100.0
Table 4.
Top Nationalities of Immigrants to Russia (2010)
Source: results of census in Russia in 2010, Rosstat
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ticipate in new post-Soviet reintegration projects, mainly in the
CU/SES not only recent visa-free regime, but even a united labor
market without any restrictions will be provided. Others not join-
ing this integration grouping and getting into conflict over it with
Russia might face tough quotas and potentially even newly intro-
duced visa regimes in the future raising the ‘price list’ of non-
membership.
Being part of the EU Single Market 
– Challenges of DCFTA
According to the EU rhetoric, the EU offer for integrating
economies of the Eastern Partners (i. e. those with WTO-mem-
berships) into the Single Market is definitely a huge benefit for
them. But seeing from the EaP side, this statement might raise
questions. DCFTAs in fact represent a package of painful measures
in the short and medium term while offering benefits (improving
economic structure and competitiveness, welfare impacts etc.)
mainly in the long term. Since the only DCFTA up till now is fi-
nalised with Ukraine, one may take the Ukrainian example to show
its contradictions with both being ‘deep’ and ‘comprehensive’. 
Firstly, in principle ‘comprehensive’ means gradual or rapid lib-
eralisation regarding all products on both EU and Ukrainian side.
In practice, according to the finalised negotiations on EU-Ukrain-
ian DCFTA, opening up occurred to be limited to the industrial
production with rather small impact on the Ukrainian economy at
least in short and medium term. The limited benefits are closely
connected both to the unfavourable structure of Ukrainian indus-
trial exports and the low level of EU average import tariff rate for
non-agricultural products (4 per cent in 2010), while the similar
Ukrainian average import tariff rate was even lower (3.8 per cent)
in 2010. The limited expectable impacts are partly due to the al-
ready performed Ukrainian liberalisation within the WTO-acces-
sion process. What is more important, lagging behind in techno-
logical level and in the production of goods with high added value,
Ukraine would be more interested in the opening up of the EU
agrarian market, in which the negotiated DCFTA offers a very
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modest progress leading to disappointment on the Ukrainian
side.33 According to the calculations made in the Institute for Eco-
nomics and Forecasting of the National Academy of Sciences of
Ukraine, “all key items of Ukrainian agrarian and foodstuff exports
(except sunflower seeds and rapeseed needed for bio energy) were
practically excluded from the free trade regime, as free trade was
granted for them only within minor tariff quotas set at the level
sometimes less than 0.1 per cent of the annual value of sales in the
EU internal market. Outside these quotas, the EU has extremely
high (actually prohibitive) import tariffs for many agrarian prod-
ucts and foodstuffs.”34 These facts are crucial for an economy fac-
ing serious difficulties since the outburst of world economic crisis,
leading to the conclusion that the expected and promised long-
term economic structural impacts are simply not motivating
enough. 
Secondly, ‘deep’ means not only classical opening up of markets
but that a difficult process of legal approximation is expected to
undertake causing potentially serious social costs. While Central
East European EU candidates naturally undertook this burden, it
is not so evident in the case of Eastern Partners who are lacking
the EU membership perspective. In their cases, it is a crucial ques-
tion what degree of adoption of EU trade acquis is reasonable and
who decides on it. According to an Ukrainian expert: „Ukraine
ended up having rather limited influence, with the EU having a
clear, non-negotiable list of commitments demanded...”35 It is not
surprising that this led to the already mentioned disappointment
in Ukraine. We argue that the EU should be more flexible in the
DCFTA negotiation process in order to be attractive enough for
its Eastern Partners. Fortunately, according to Georgian expert
view, Georgia made ‘a better job’ or the EU drew the conclusions.
Georgian negotiators managed to influence the process of approx-
imation in order to protect its national interest to a higher extent.36
33 The EU argues that the limited offer regarding agricultural trade is due to the Common Ag-
ricultural Policy, which cannot be modified just for Ukraine. 
34 More details see in Sidenko (2013).
35 Shumylo –Tapiola (2012) p. 20.
36 Kakulia (2013)
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Conclusions
Attractiveness of the EU versus Russia in the light of the three Ms
(market, mobility and money) and conditionality
Based on the analysis of trade flows between European post-Soviet
states and Russia on the one hand, and with the EU on the other,
we may draw the conclusion that although Russia still considers
itself as the economic centre of the post-Soviet space, this role has
been greatly challenged by the growing trade importance of the
EU (and others like Turkey or China). Research on other kinds
of economic ties such as FDI and labor migration may tincture
this picture. While EU capital is dominating, Russia as a source of
FDI is also considerable, however, not always so visible. Naturally,
the picture is differentiated in individual country cases. Consider-
ing labor force movements from individual post-Soviet countries,
the EU is a most reluctant partner, while Russia has recently
launched a policy of differentiation with offering united labor mar-
ket for some countries while formulating toughening limits to the
others. Why are these facts important? 
Based on recent strength of economic links between individual
EaPs and Russia, it is obvious that although they have been weak-
ened to a great extent since the 1990’s in several cases they are
still strong enough to be a reasonable basis for joining Russia-led
post-Soviet integrations. Therefore, the forced choice might be
painful. The EU should take into consideration this fact to a
greater extent than it does. The carrot offered to the Eastern Part-
ners aimed at involving them both into the political association
and the economic integration should be attractive enough and giv-
en in due time. Political conditionality, uncertainties of economic
benefits of DCFTAs in short and medium term, reluctance to pro-
vide mobility to the citizens of EaPs and the lack of really moti-
vating amount of EU financial support may lead to an unexpected
result: pushing some of the Eastern Partners to look for other in-
tegration schemes and partners. Russia is ready to grab the oppor-
tunity. The three ‘Ms’ does not seem to function well. Moreover,
other major international players (like Turkey, the regional power
Turkey or even China, the global player) have their economic in-
terests in the region as well, with their ‘offers’ often being without
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(hard) ‘conditions’. For all the above reasons, the EU should be
more pragmatic when formulating its Eastern Partnership policy,
paying much more attention to the ‘Russia factor’. Otherwise it
might be a loser due to its slowness, cautiousness and strict set of
both political and economic conditions.
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